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This particular ISPOR Task Force set out to deter-
mine the needs of decision makers in relation to
pharmacoeconomic/health economic studies, in
particular economic evaluations. Most health econ-
omists have been brought up to believe that there is
little place for the concept of “need” unless it is
deﬁned as “capacity to beneﬁt.” You cannot need
something if you do not have the capacity to beneﬁt
from having it. So if decision makers need economic
evaluations then it will be because they have the
capacity to beneﬁt from them. But that is the prob-
lem, which the Task Force has delicately uncovered
(again)—it is far from clear that most decision mak-
ers do currently have the capacity to beneﬁt from
economic evaluations.
The temptation is for decision makers to turn this
into a problem of communication and translation
and health economists to go along with this diag-
nosis in masochistic fashion. But this is a fallacy.
Physicists can certainly attempt to communicate the
“gist” of relativity theory to the nonphysicist, but it
can only be the gist, not the theory, or the analysis
underlying it. It is not a failure of communication to
say that at the end of even the most valiant attempt
(e.g., by Stephen Hawking) many of us have only
very modest and partial understanding and that
black holes are still a “black box.” That is our prob-
lem, not the physicists. Technical language, too often
disparaged as jargon, is usually the necessary reﬂec-
tion and embodiment of the analysis-to-intuition
ratio appropriate to the discourse concerned. Its
function is not to impose “artiﬁcial” barriers
between different discourses, or to be “excluding,”
but the latter is its necessary and unavoidable con-
sequence. (The use of jargon to defend incomes or
status is not unknown but it is only because there is
a genuine reason for jargon that this ploy can work.)
The difference with health care is that we are not
making decisions about space travel. Health econ-
omists who sit on bodies such as NICE are often
intrigued by the imbalance between the rigor
required and displayed in the papers submitted to
the committee and the rigor of the ensuing discus-
sion of them. This is not a question of the integrity
or effort or values of the people involved in the dis-
cussion, but of the simple difference, verging on
incompatibility, between the analysis-to-intuition
ratio essential to the reports (on clinical or cost-
effectiveness) and the analysis-to-intuition ratio
possible in any conversational or discursive process.
This is true whatever the analytical capacities of the
people present, but it is much compounded by the
presence of vastly differing levels and types of ana-
lytical capacity, all too often gloriﬁed as constituting
“multidisciplinarity.” This is not a critique of the
principle of multidisciplinarity in its ideal form, but
a sensible skepticism about its actual practice and
its almost ubiquitous tendency to degenerate into
something approaching nondisciplinarity.
Of course many will prefer this discursive process
and enunciate various worries about black box
models, especially their opaqueness, and the dan-
gers of “technocratic reductionism.” But transpar-
ency is in the eye of the beholder and it is well
known that we see what we believe, that is, are able
to see given our beliefs and capacities, rather than
believe what we see. What we can see through is
determined by the penetrating capacity of our
vision. That capacity should be appropriate to the
task and this applies to those charged with decision
making as well as any other task. For me the great
value of the report lies in the fact that it eventually
concludes that we must be very careful about deﬁn-
ing best/good practice in catering for the needs of
decision makers when those (perceived) needs may
reﬂect poor practice in decision making.
